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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 21, 2005, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that 
county child protection workers may be liable at common law for 
negligent investigations under the Child Abuse Reporting Act 
(CARA).1  In so doing, the court waded once again into a thicket of 
 
        †  Adjunct professors, William Mitchell College of Law. 
 1. Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 799 (Minn. 2005).  
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legal doctrines used to determine when Minnesota law provides a 
cause of action against government actors who are negligent in the 
performance of their duties.   
Much of the confusion in this area flows from cases 
discussing—and sometimes conflating—two separate legal 
doctrines: (1) the so-called “public duty” rule governing common law 
negligence actions arising from an official’s performance of 
statutory duties,2 and (2) the distinct analysis used to divine 
whether the legislature has implicitly provided for a statutory cause 
of action in such cases.  In Radke v. County of Freeborn, the court 
restored some clarity to this area by overruling its earlier decision 
in Hoppe v. Kandiyohi County,3 a case which seemed to merge these 
two analyses.  In Radke, the court confirmed that the public duty 
rule can give rise to common law tort liability based upon child 
protection workers’ duties to a victim under CARA, separate and 
apart from the question of whether the legislature implicitly 
provided for such a cause of action in the statute itself.4  However, 
the court passed up the opportunity to clarify the status of other 
precedents, leaving some questions in this area still unanswered.  
Part II of this Article traces the separate development of the 
common law public duty rule and the implied statutory cause of 
action analysis.  Part III examines the Hoppe case, where the 
supreme court seemed to hold that the absence of an implied 
statutory cause of action precluded the existence of a common law 
cause of action.  Part IV then assesses the Radke court’s effort to 
resolve the confusion flowing from Hoppe. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This section discusses the key cases underlying the two distinct 
doctrines relating to whether a cause of action exists for negligence 
by government actors: the common law public duty rule and the 
implied statutory cause of action analysis. 
 
       2. “[T]he ‘public duty rule’ requires that a governmental unit owe the 
plaintiff a duty different from that owed to the general public in order for the 
governmental unit to be found liable.  In other words, a purely ‘public duty’—as 
opposed to a ‘special duty’—cannot give rise to government tort liability.”  Id. at 
793 (citations omitted).  
 3. 543 N.W.2d 635 (Minn. 1996). 
 4. 694 N.W.2d at 798-99. 
06MAHONEY.DOC 5/31/2006  1:12:03 PM 
2006] THE RETURN OF THE PUBLIC DUTY RULE? 1385 
A.   The Common Law Public Duty Rule 
It is settled law that a person has no duty to prevent a third 
party from physically harming a victim unless either (1) the person 
and the third party have a special relationship that imposes a duty 
upon the person to control the third party’s conduct, or (2) the 
person has a special relationship with the victim that gives the 
injured party a right to protection.5  Three cases illustrate how this 
principle has developed under Minnesota law where the alleged 
tortfeasor is a government actor. 
1. Lorshbough v. Township of Buzzle 
In Lorshbough v. Township of Buzzle, a landowner sued a 
township and a county for damages to his property resulting from a 
fire that started in the township’s dump.6  Lorshbough brought a 
common law negligence action, relying on solid waste management 
laws to establish the township’s duty of care.7  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must either show that the 
township or county owed him a duty that it did not owe the general 
public,8 or that the plaintiff “distinguished himself from other 
members of the public” through “some sort of contact between the 
governmental unit and the plaintiff” that induced detrimental 
reliance by the plaintiff.9  Because the county had “actual 
knowledge of the risk of serious harm” and was “in a position and 
had the authority to abate the risk,” the plaintiff was able to 
establish that the county owed him a duty derived from statute that 
was not owed to the general public.10 
2. Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park 
Seven years later, a divided Minnesota Supreme Court 
provided further guidance for determining whether a duty owed 
was “public” or “private.”  The court held that even if a municipality 
enacts a general ordinance or makes inspections, it has no 
common law duty to prevent a third person from harming another 
 
 5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). 
 6. 258 N.W.2d 96, 97 (Minn. 1977). 
 7. Id. at 97-98. 
 8. Id. at 98-99 (citing Hoffert v. Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, Inc., 293 Minn. 
220, 222, 199 N.W.2d 158, 160 (1972)). 
 9. Id. at 99. 
 10. Id. at 103. 
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unless there is some sort of special duty arising from a special 
relationship between the municipality and the third person.11  In 
Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, two fathers sued the City of St. Louis 
Park, alleging that a city inspector negligently failed to discover a 
fire ordinance violation at a school.12  Two boys died and another 
suffered severe burns when a fifty-five-gallon drum of highly 
flammable duplicating fluid exploded on a loading dock near a 
frequently used entrance.13 
The court explained that, regardless of whether the defendant 
is a natural person or a municipality, a duty owed to the public in 
general cannot form the basis of a negligence action.14  It then 
discussed four non-exclusive factors to be considered when 
evaluating whether a municipality has voluntarily assumed a special 
duty to protect others and not merely itself.15  The court stated that 
two factors which tend to impose a duty of care are the 
municipality’s actual knowledge of the dangerous condition and a 
person’s reliance on the municipality’s representations and 
conduct, neither of which were present on the facts of Cracraft.16  
The third factor identified by the court was the possibility that an 
ordinance or statute may have created a duty of care by setting 
forth “mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class 
of persons rather than the public as a whole.”17  On this factor, the 
court refused to impose a duty of care merely because an 
inspection was undertaken, stating that the codes, ordinances, and 
statutes were not “drawn with sufficient specificity to create an 
inspection duty in favor of a class of individuals.”18  The fourth 
factor considered was whether the municipality used due care to 
avoid increasing the risk of harm.19  The court found that the 
defendant-municipality in Cracraft did nothing to increase the risk 
of harm.20  Based on its analysis of these factors, the court 
concluded that the City of St. Louis Park owed only a general duty 
to the public rather than a more specific duty to a special class of 
 
 11. Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn. 1979). 
 12. Id. at 802-03. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 804. 
 15. Id. at 806-07. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 807. 
 18. Id. at 807-08. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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individuals, and as a result no cause of action could be maintained 
at common law.21 
3. Andrade v. Ellefson 
In 1986, the Minnesota Supreme Court, with three justices 
concurring specially, applied the four Cracraft factors to find that 
Anoka County owed children and their parents a special duty 
different from the duty owed to the general public when it 
inspected and licensed daycare facilities.22  In Andrade v. Ellefson, 
two fathers sued an in-home day care operator and Anoka County 
for injuries their children sustained while at the day care center.23  
The plaintiffs alleged that they had a special relationship with 
Anoka County and that the county was therefore required to 
exercise due care when inspecting and supervising day care centers 
it licensed.24 
The court first found that Anoka County had waived immunity 
to the extent that it purchased liability insurance, and then turned 
to the special duty issue.25  After noting the general rule that a 
person has no common law duty to prevent a third person from 
injuring another absent a special relationship, the court explained 
that not all four Cracraft factors need be satisfied to find a cause of 
action, especially where one factor predominates.26  The court also 
reiterated that other, unarticulated factors may be relevant.27  The 
court then relied on the third Cracraft factor—the existence of a 
statute requiring “mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a 
particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole”28—to 
find that the Public Welfare Licensing Act29 mandated that small 
children in a licensed day care facility be considered a particular 
protected class because of their unique vulnerability and because 
the statute’s focus on children demonstrated a clear intent to 
 
 21. Id. at 808. 
 22. Andrade v. Ellefson, 391 N.W.2d 836, 840-43 (Minn. 1986). 
 23. Id. at 837. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 840-42. 
 26. Id. at 841. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 807. 
 29. MINN. STAT. §§ 245.781-.812 (1984) (repealed 1987); see MINN. STAT. 
§ 252.28, subd. 2 (2004).  See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 245A.01-.65 (incorporating 
many provisions of the Public Welfare Licensing Act in the Human Services 
Licensing Act). 
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benefit these children specifically rather than the public 
generally.30  The court held that the Act created a duty of care 
because the Act set forth mandatory acts for the protection of a 
particular class of persons.31 
These cases thus established the contours of the common law 
public duty analysis:  Lorshbough demonstrated that the special 
relationship exception to general tort principles regarding duty of 
care could be applied to government actors, Cracraft introduced 
four factors to guide courts when dealing with such claims, and 
Andrade explained how those factors should be applied.32 
B.  Implied Statutory Causes of Action 
Up to this point, the discussion has focused on the common 
law’s recognition of causes of action derived from statutory duties.  
But, in addition to judge-made common law causes of action, new 
causes of action may also be created by the legislature.  When the 
legislature is explicit about its intent to create a new cause of 
action, courts ordinarily do not hesitate to apply the new cause of 
action, even alongside traditional common law causes of action.33  
 
 30. Andrade, 391 N.W.2d at 842. 
 31. Id.  Justices Wahl and Yetka concurred specially, due to their belief that 
two other Cracraft factors (actual knowledge and reasonable reliance) had been 
satisfied.  Id. at 843-44.  Justice Scott concurred in the result, arguing that in these 
cases, the court should not analyze whether a county owes a special duty to the 
plaintiff, but rather the court should impose a duty of care on the county because 
it undertook the inspection of the facility.  Id. at 845-46. 
 32.  The four-factor analysis articulated in Cracraft for determining whether a 
governmental entity owes the plaintiff a special duty, different from the duty owed 
the general public, now appears to be settled law.  See, e.g., Radke v. County of 
Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 796-98 (Minn. 2005); Andrade, 391 N.W.2d at 841-43.  
However, it is important to note that the holding in Cracraft was not unanimous.  
Three justices, including Justice Scott, dissented in Cracraft, arguing that the 
majority’s approach departed from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Cracraft v. 
City of St. Paul, 279 N.W.2d 801, 808-13 (Minn. 1979).  Two years later in Hage v. 
Stade, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on Cracraft when holding that a cause 
of action could not be brought against the State for an allegedly negligent fire 
inspection.  304 N.W.2d 283, 285-88 (Minn. 1981).  This time, three justices joined 
Justice Scott in his detailed dissent, which discussed how Cracraft departed from 
the common law.  Id. at 291-96.  Justice Scott also noted that Cracraft conflicted 
with Lorshbaugh, which allowed constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition 
to create a duty; Cracraft limited its first factor to actual knowledge of a dangerous 
conditions.  Id. at 294 n.8.  In addition, Justice Scott argued that the artificial 
distinction between a public duty and a private duty essentially grants sovereign 
immunity where the legislature has not spoken.  Id. at 289. 
 33. For example, the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA) created a 
cause of action allowing any person to bring a civil action for protection of natural 
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Problems arise, however, when the legislature is unclear about its 
intention to create—or withhold—a cause of action to enforce 
statutory rights.  In those situations, Minnesota’s appellate courts 
have taken markedly different approaches to determining whether 
an implied statutory cause of action can be found. 
1.   The Minnesota Court of Appeals’ Approach 
In the Minnesota Court of Appeals, this issue is usually 
addressed under the framework established in Counties of Blue Earth 
v. Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry34 and Flour Exchange 
Building Corp. v. State.35  That analysis follows the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s analysis of this issue in Cort v. Ash36 and requires the 
examination of three factors: 
(1) whether the plaintiff belongs to the class for whose 
benefit the statute was enacted;  
(2) whether the legislature indicated an intent to create 
or deny a remedy; and 
(3) whether implying a remedy would be consistent with 
the underlying purposes of the legislative enactment.37 
The court of appeals has applied this analysis to a range of statutes 
but has yet to find an implied statutory cause of action under this 
approach.38 
 
resources located in Minnesota against “pollution, impairment, or destruction.”  
MINN. STAT. § 116B.03 (2004).  This express statutory cause of action has been 
successfully used alongside traditional common law causes of action like trespass.  
See, e.g., Citizens for a Safe Grant v. Lone Oak Sportsmen’s Club, Inc., 624 N.W.2d 
796 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming injunction against gun club based on MERA 
as well as common law nuisance and trespass causes of action). 
 34. 489 N.W.2d 265 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 35. 524 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). 
 36. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).  There is considerable doubt about whether the 
Supreme Court continues to strictly adhere to this analysis.  See Thompson v. 
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It could not be plainer that 
we effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis . . . converting one of its four 
factors (congressional intent) into the determinative factor, with the other three 
merely indicative of its presence or absence.”) (citations omitted). 
 37. Flour Exch. Bldg., 524 N.W.2d at 499. 
 38. See, e.g., Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Midway Massage, Inc., 695 N.W.2d 138, 
142 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); Buck v. Freeeman, 619 N.W.2d 793, 797-98 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2000);  Kuelbs v. Williams, 609 N.W.2d 10, 14-15 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); 
Eason v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 598 N.W.2d 414, 417-18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
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2.   The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Approach 
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court shares the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals’ reluctance to find implicit statutory causes of 
action, the precise contours of its analysis are less clear.  In Bruegger 
v. Faribault County Sheriff’s Department, the supreme court reaffirmed 
that as a general matter, “[p]rinciples of judicial restraint” 
precluded it from finding a statutory cause of action “where the 
legislature has not either by the statute’s express terms or by 
implication provided for civil tort liability.”39  However, the court 
offered no analysis of how or when such an implication may arise, 
and its discussion seemed to blur the distinction between implying 
such a statutory cause of action and the common law public duty 
rule.40   
In Bruegger, the parents of a minor who was a victim of sexual 
abuse sued the Faribault County Sheriff’s Department because 
officials did not inform them that they might be able to obtain 
compensation under the Crime Victims Reparations Act (CVRA).41  
The statute required applications for compensation to be made 
within one year of the injury unless the victim was “unable” to do 
so; however, the statute further provided that lack of knowledge 
about the statute—including the failure of law enforcement to 
inform a claimant about the statute—would not excuse compliance 
with the one-year filing deadline.42  The Brueggers did not learn 
about their rights under CVRA until after one year had elapsed.43  
They then sued the sheriff’s department, alleging that the statute 
created “an affirmative duty on the sheriff’s department to inform 
them of the CVRA and that the department’s failure to inform the 
family was a breach of this duty.”44 
The Brueggers argued that the case was controlled by the 
supreme court’s holding in Lorshbough v. Township of Buzzle.45  As 
discussed above, the court held in Lorshbough that a statute 
governing solid waste disposal established the standard of care for 
the county’s management of a garbage dump, and that the county’s 
breach of the duty—created by its actual knowledge of the risk of 
 
 39. 497 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn. 1993). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 261. 
 42. MINN. STAT. § 611A.53, subd. 2(e) (1992). 
 43. Bruegger, 497 N.W.2d at 261. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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serious harm and by its opportunity to abate the risk, which led to a 
forest fire—gave rise to liability in tort.46  The Bruegger court 
rejected the analogy to Lorshbough and purported to draw a 
distinction between situations like Lorshbough, where a statutory 
duty was the basis for a common law negligence action, and the 
separate question of whether a statute implicitly creates a new cause 
of action.47  The court noted that in Lorshbough, even in the absence 
of a statute, “Beltrami County would still have been subject to suit 
in common law negligence because of its failure to properly 
maintain the dump,” presumably because that failure created a 
common law nuisance.48  The court contrasted this with the 
situation in Bruegger, where, according to the court, “no common 
law duty required the sheriff’s department to inform the Brueggers 
of their potential rights of recovery under the CVRA.49  The 
requirement to inform did not arise until the enactment of the 
CVRA.”50  The implication, at least, was that the proper inquiry 
under the facts was whether the legislature intended to impose civil 
tort liability upon a law enforcement agency for failing to inform 
crime victims of their rights under CVRA—that is, whether the 
legislature implicitly meant to create a statutory cause of action.  
But, in answering this question in the negative, the court did not 
identify any specific factors to guide its analysis.  Perhaps more 
troubling is that the Brueggers’ claim was, according to the court, a 
claim for “negligence,” a term which at least suggests the assertion 
of a common law cause of action in the mold of Lorshbough and, 
more importantly, Cracraft and its progeny.  Yet the Bruegger court’s 
assertion, without further analysis, that “no common law duty” 
existed on the part of the sheriff’s department to inform the 
Brueggers about the existence of the CVRA seemed to ignore 
Cracraft, where the court created a multi-factor analysis, one part of 
which serves to determine whether or not a statute gives rise to 
such a common law duty.51 
 
 46. Lorshbough v. Twp. of Buzzle, 258 N.W.2d 96, 103 (Minn. 1977). 
 47. Bruegger, 497 N.W.2d at 261-62. 
 48. Id. at 262. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. This distinction between a common law cause of action based on a 
statutory duty and a purely statutory cause of action is more than just a matter of 
semantics.  A common law negligence action based on a statutory duty remains a 
common law cause of action, with all of its attendant common law elements and 
common law defenses.  In contrast, the elements of a statutory cause of action, 
whether express or implied, flow from the statute and its interpretation and may 
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The confusion reflected in Bruegger regarding the distinction 
between the public duty rule and implied statutory causes of action 
set the stage for the supreme court’s 1996 holding in Hoppe v. 
Kandiyohi County that failure to comply with the Vulnerable Adults 
Reporting Act (VARA) did not give rise to tort liability52—a holding 
subsequently reversed in Radke.53  Because of the importance of 
Hoppe to understanding the Radke decision, the next section of this 
Article examines Hoppe in depth. 
III.  HOPPE V. KANDIYOHI COUNTY 
A.   Statutory Background 
The statute at issue in Hoppe was VARA, which in 1994 
mandated that particular individuals were required to report 
suspected neglect or abuse of vulnerable adults, and listed the 
duties of the local welfare agency upon receipt of a report.54  At 
that time, VARA provided that a person who failed to make a 
required report was guilty of a misdemeanor and that a person who 
negligently or intentionally failed to make a required report would 
be liable for damages resulting from that failure.55  The statute 
stated that a person who made a voluntary or mandatory report or 
participated in an investigation would be immune from any civil or 
criminal liability if that person acted in good faith.56 
The statute also imposed obligations on certain governmental 
actors to “immediately” take certain measures in response to 
 
thus be significantly different from analogous common law causes of action.  To 
return to a prior example, a MERA cause of action has elements quite different 
from a trespass cause of action, even though both may peacefully co-exist in the 
same lawsuit.  See, e.g., Citizens for a Safe Grant v. Lone Oak Sportsmen’s Club, 
Inc., 624 N.W.2d 796, 804-06 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (identifying elements of 
common law trespass and the distinct elements of a statutory MERA claim); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 cmt. b (2005) (“[L]arge numbers of statutes, 
in declaring conduct unlawful and creating a public-law penalty, are silent as to 
private liability in the event of a statutory violation.  In a suit brought by the victim 
of such a violation, the court, relying on ordinary principles of legislative 
interpretation, may in appropriate cases infer from the statute a cause of action for 
damages against the violator.”). 
 52. 543 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Minn. 1996). 
 53. See infra Part IV. 
 54. MINN. STAT. § 626.557, subds. 3, 10 (1994). 
 55. Id. subd. 7. 
 56. Id. subd. 5. 
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reports of abuse.57  Subdivision 10 of the statute provided that upon 
receipt of a report, the “local welfare agency shall immediately 
investigate and offer emergency and continuing protective social 
services.”58  Subdivision 11a similarly provided that “upon receipt” 
of an abuse report from a social service agency, “the prosecuting 
authority shall immediately investigate, prosecute when warranted, 
and transmit its findings and disposition to the referring agency.”59  
These requirements to take “immediate” action—and the alleged 
failure of officials in Kandiyohi County to do so—were at the center 
of the Hoppe case. 
B.   The Facts and the Claims 
The Hoppe case involved a claim of financial exploitation of an 
older adult.  Georgia Hoppe, who was more than ninety years old at 
the time the case arose, had appointed Paul Bengston as her 
attorney-in-fact to help her manage her financial affairs.60  
Bengston was an employee of Green Lake State Bank, where 
Hoppe had an account.61  From June 1989 to November 1990, 
Bengston wrote numerous checks on Hoppe’s account, including 
checks payable to Bengston.62  Bengston subsequently admitted to 
forging Hoppe’s signature.63 
In March 1990, another bank employee, Allen Struck, spoke 
with Hoppe about the activity on her account.64  According to 
Struck, Hoppe seemed to have complete trust in Bengston.65  
Struck then took his concerns to Sondra Anderson at Kandiyohi 
County Family Services, who in turn contacted the Kandiyohi 
Sheriff’s Department and the County Attorney and completed a 
Vulnerable Adult Complaint.66 
At the County Attorney’s suggestion, it was decided that a 
mental health worker would meet with Hoppe and evaluate 
whether she understood what Bengston was doing with her 
 
 57. Id. subds. 4, 4a. 
 58. Id. subd. 10(a). 
 59. Id. subd. 11a. 
 60. Stipulation of Facts at 1-2, Hoppe v. Kandiyohi County, No. C6-93-1215 
(Dist. Ct. Kandiyohi County 1994). 
 61. Id. at 1. 
 62. Id. at 2. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 3. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 3-4. 
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money.67  After the evaluation, either the county social services 
workers or the County Attorney were to advise the sheriff’s office as 
to whether further investigation by law enforcement was 
warranted.68  Despite this plan, the county took no further action 
for more than six months.69  In that time, nineteen checks payable 
to Bengston and allegedly signed by Hoppe were drawn on 
Hoppe’s account at Green Lake State Bank, for a total of $54,500.70 
On October 10, 1990, Struck contacted Anderson again and 
told her that Bengston had taken substantial amounts of Hoppe’s 
money, had cashed in some of her bonds, and was giving money to 
his children and taking trips to Las Vegas.71  After relaying some of 
this information to the sheriff’s department, Kandiyohi County 
Family Services sent two employees to interview Hoppe on October 
19, 1990.72  Hoppe appeared confused about dates and names and 
about her financial situation.73  She also told the Family Services 
workers that she was being abused by staff at the nursing home and 
that she wished she would die.74 
The following day, one of the Family Services workers who 
interviewed Hoppe met with the County Attorney, who agreed to 
help the Family Services agency commence guardianship 
proceedings.75  About five weeks later, a Vulnerable Adult 
Maltreatment Report was prepared by Family Services, and a special 
guardian was appointed on November 30, 1990.76  That action 
terminated Bengston’s power-of-attorney.77  In the meantime, 
however, eight more checks payable to Bengston and totaling 
$17,200 had been drawn on Hoppe’s account from October 22 to 
November 28, 1990.78 
 
 67. Id. at 4. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 4-5. 
 70. Id. at 5-8.  The stipulation also notes the existence of two other checks 
payable to Bengston, totaling $10,000, pre-dating the March 20, 1990 conference. 
Id. at 3, 5. 
 71. Id. at 7-8. 
 72. Id. at 8-9. 
 73. Id. at 9-11. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 11. 
 76. Id. at 13. 
 77. Id. at 1. 
 78. Id. at 11-13. 
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C.   The Lawsuit and the District Court’s Decision 
After settling a claim against the Green Lake State Bank for 
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, Hoppe sued Kandiyohi 
County for failing to take immediate steps to protect Hoppe from 
financial exploitation after the March 1990 report made by bank 
employee Struck, and for subsequent delays in investigating the 
case.79  Hoppe and the county both moved for summary 
judgment.80 
The district court modeled its analysis largely on the supreme 
court’s discussion in Bruegger.  The district court first noted that the 
provisions of VARA requiring the County Attorney to immediately 
investigate vulnerable adult abuse reports did not create a private 
cause of action against the county.81  The court then cited Bruegger 
as standing for the proposition that “[a] statute does not create a 
private cause of action if, absent the statute, the county would not 
be subject to suit in common law negligence.”82  The district court 
thus appears to have read Bruegger as completely precluding the 
possibility that a statute might imply a cause of action.83  Citing 
Lorshbough, the court stated that it would have reached a different 
conclusion if the county had been “subject to suit in common law 
negligence absent the statute,” but noted that no common law duty 
existed requiring the County Attorney to immediately investigate 
financial exploitation.84  The court therefore found that the county 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.85 
D.   The Decision of the Court of Appeals 
Shortly after appealing the district court’s order, Hoppe died.86  
In the Statement of the Case to the court of appeals, Hoppe’s 
personal representative and former guardian characterized her 
 
 79. Hoppe v. Kandiyohi County, No. C6-93-1215, slip op. at 4 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
Kandiyohi County 1994).  The County, in turn, named the bank and Bengston as 
third-party defendants.  Id.  Their role in the proceedings is not further discussed 
here. 
 80. Id. at 1. 
 81. Id. at 4-5. 
 82. Id. at 5 (citing Bruegger v. Fairbault County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 497 N.W.2d 
260, 262 (Minn. 1993)). 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. (citing Lorshbough v. Twp. of Buzzle, 258 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1977)). 
 85. Id. at 6. 
 86. Hoppe v. Kandiyohi County, No. C0-94-1627, 1995 WL 70167, at *2 
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1995). 
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claim as a “negligence action . . . as a result of the County’s breach 
of its duties under the Vulnerable Adults Act and at common law.”87 
Unlike the district court’s focus on the responsibilities of the 
County Attorney under subdivision 11 of VARA, the court of 
appeals focused on the obligations of the Kandiyohi County Family 
Services agency under subdivision 10(c).88  The court noted that 
the statute did not expressly make a county liable for failing to 
carry out its duties to immediately investigate and offer protective 
services, but ultimately found the case “similar” to Andrade v. 
Ellefson.89  Writing on behalf of the court, Judge Amundson applied 
the factors promulgated in Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park and 
found that vulnerable adults were a “‘particular protected class’ 
and, like children, ‘uniquely vulnerable.’”90  Judge Amundson also 
noted that the facts in Hoppe’s case were even more compelling 
than in Andrade, as “the county had actual knowledge of the danger 
to Hoppe.”91  Based on this analysis, the court found that a special 
relationship existed between the county’s social service agency and 
Hoppe, “giving rise to a tort duty of care owed by the county to 
Hoppe.”92 
E.   The Supreme Court’s Decision 
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review and 
unanimously reversed the court of appeals, reinstating summary 
judgment for the county.93  The court distinguished Andrade on the 
basis that the statute at issue in Andrade had not discussed penalties 
or liability, while the legislature had spoken to the question of 
penalties imposed for failure to make a report under VARA, and 
had not identified consequences for failure to investigate or 
 
 87. Appellant’s Statement of the Case at 1, Hoppe v. Kandiyohi County, No. 
C0-94-1627, 1995 WL 70167 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1995). 
 88. Hoppe, 1995 WL 70167, at *4. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at *5. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.  In reaching this result, the court also distinguished one of its own 
recent cases, Valtakis v. Putnam, 504 N.W.2d 264 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).  Hoppe, 
1995 WL 70167, at *5.  In Valtakis, the court had declined to find a private cause of 
action under CARA—the statute that would eventually be at issue in Radke.  504 
N.W.2d at 267.  The court distinguished Valtakis on the grounds that the court 
there “did not consider Cracraft or Andrade in reaching its decision.”  Hoppe, 1995 
WL 70167, at *5. 
 93. Hoppe v. Kandiyohi County, 543 N.W.2d 635, 636 (Minn. 1996). 
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intervene.94  Accordingly, the court found that the legislature had 
not explicitly or by implication identified a civil cause of action for 
alleged negligent investigation or intervention.95  The court stated 
that it was relying upon Bruegger v. Faribault County Sheriff’s 
Department,96 but the court’s reasoning appears to have gone further 
than that case.  In Bruegger, the court rejected the Brueggers’ claims 
because the statute at issue had not expressly or impliedly provided 
for a cause of action.97  In Hoppe, the statute at issue did explicitly 
provide for a cause of action in some circumstances, but was silent 
regarding others.98  Thus one possible reading of Bruegger and 
Hoppe is that Bruegger was governed by the rule that “statutes are 
presumed not to alter or modify the common law unless they 
expressly so provide,”99 while in Hoppe the court found that by 
imposing penalties for some behaviors but not for the specific 
wrongs alleged in that case, the legislature did modify the common 
law (albeit by omission) and that precluded liability for those 
specific wrongs.100 
F.  Summary 
After these cases it was unclear when (or whether) the Cracraft 
factors were to be applied to tort claims based upon statutory 
duties.  In Bruegger, the supreme court seemingly ignored Cracraft 
and Andrade, discussing the older Lorshbough v. Township of Buzzle 
case instead.  The court did discuss Andrade in Hoppe, but seemed 
to limit its application to circumstances where the legislature had 
been completely silent regarding liability.  Additionally, the court 
of appeals and supreme court appeared to part ways on the proper 
analysis to be applied when determining whether a statute 
 
 94. Id. at 638. 
 95. Id.  The court did not discuss whether the Cracraft factors could still show 
that a “special relationship” existed between the county and Hoppe.  In this 
respect, the court’s decision resembles the reasoning in Valtakis, which the court 
of appeals distinguished (and perhaps implicitly criticized) in its own review of 
Hoppe’s claim.  See Hoppe, 1995 WL 70167, at *5. 
 96. Hoppe, 543 N.W.2d at 638. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (“Here, unlike in Andrade, the legislature has spoken to the question 
of penalties of liability to be imposed with regard to the Vulnerable Adults 
Reporting Act and has not explicitly or by implication identified a civil cause of 
action for alleged negligent investigation or intervention.”). 
 99. Bruegger v. Faribault County Sheriff’s Dept., 497 N.W.2d 260, 262 
(quoting Agassiz v. Magnusson, 272 Minn. 156, 166, 136 N.W.2d 861, 868 (1965)). 
 100. See Hoppe, 543 N.W.2d at 638. 
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implicitly creates a cause of action.  The court of appeals adopted a 
three-factor test for this issue, while the supreme court’s analysis 
remained more nebulous. 
The approaches taken by the court of appeals and supreme 
court to the question of how statutory duties factor into tort claims 
thus reflected something of a jumble of two, and possibly three, 
legal doctrines—the common law public duty rule, the implied 
statutory cause of action analysis, and the question of whether the 
legislature has modified the common law.  This was the state of the 
law when the Radke case arose. 
IV. THE RADKE CASE 
A.  Statutory Background 
The Radke case involved CARA, one of a set of reporting acts 
relating specifically to protecting children who may be neglected or 
abused.101  The legislature stated that 
the public policy of this state is to protect children whose 
health or welfare may be jeopardized through physical 
abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse . . . .  [I]t is the intent of 
the legislature . . . to strengthen the family and make the 
home, school, and community safe for children by 
promoting responsible child care in all settings; and to 
provide, when necessary, a safe temporary or permanent 
home environment for physically or sexually abused or 
neglected children.102 
CARA specifies the persons who are required to report 
suspected child abuse, the methods of making reports, the agencies 
responsible for assessing or investigating reports of maltreatment, 
and the duties of those agencies upon receipt of a report.103  Like 
VARA, CARA imposes obligations to take certain measures in 
response to reports of abuse.104  Likewise, CARA lists criminal 
penalties for failure to report, and provides immunity from civil or 
 
 101. MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2004).  In addition to CARA and VARA, other 
reporting acts deal with health professionals’ reports of suspicious wounds and 
reports of crimes motivated by bias.  See id. §§ 626.52, 626.5531 (mandating health 
care professionals’ reports of suspicious wounds and peace officers’ reports of 
crimes motivated by bias, respectively). 
 102. Id. § 626.556, subd. 1. 
 103. See id. subds. 2, 3-3c, 7, 10. 
 104. Id. subd. 10. 
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criminal liability for persons acting in good faith and assisting in 
the assessment, but offers no immunity if the person fails to make a 
required report or is the abuser.105  The statute now provides that if 
a person makes a report and prevails in a civil action because that 
person was granted immunity, that person can get attorney fees.106  
As a result, one could argue that the revised statute seems to 
contemplate a civil cause of action for a failure to report.107  
Arguably, if a statutory civil cause of action can be implied for a 
failure to report, one can also be implied for a failure to investigate 
or intervene.108  However, as is discussed further below, in Radke the 
Minnesota Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether a 
statutory cause of action is available and instead focused on the 
common law arguments.109 
B. Facts and Procedural History 
In January 2003, Matthew Radke brought a common law 
negligence action against Freeborn County and two of its social 
workers, alleging that their failure to act in good faith and with due 
care in following the investigatory procedures of CARA resulted in 
the wrongful death of his and Peggy Radke’s son Makaio.110  From 
 
 105. Id. subds. 4-5. 
 106. Id. subd. 4(d).  This provision did not exist when the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals, applying the framework in Bruegger, held that no common law duty to 
report existed before the statute was enacted, that the only issue was whether the 
legislature intended there to be a cause of action, and that the legislature did not 
expressly or impliedly create a cause of action for a failure to make a required 
report under CARA.  Valtakis v. Putnam, 504 N.W.2d 264, 266-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1993). 
 107. The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected this argument in Kuelbs v. 
Williams, 609 N.W.2d 10, 15 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).  The supreme court denied 
review of that case, in which Kuelbs argued that a police officer made a report of 
child abuse in bad faith.  Id. at 13.  It is conceivable that public policy concerns 
may preclude a cause of action in the type of situation involved in Kuelbs, as 
opposed when someone fails to make a required report of abuse. 
 108. In Valtakis, the court stated that the legislature did not intend to create a 
civil remedy for a failure to report because it expressly imposed a criminal penalty 
and made no mention of a civil remedy.  504 N.W.2d at 266.  Because CARA 
includes no proscribed criminal penalties for a failure to investigate, it seems that 
the reasoning in Valtakis does not necessarily preclude an implied statutory civil 
cause of action for a failure to investigate or intervene. 
 109. The court did not discuss statutory causes of action, but hinted that one 
may be implied by CARA’s grant of immunity.  Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 
N.W.2d 788, 796 n.3 (Minn. 2005). 
 110. Radke specifically alleged that the County failed to exercise its duties 
under Minnesota Statute section 626.556, subdivisions 10(a) and 10(h)-(j).  
06MAHONEY.DOC 5/31/2006  1:12:03 PM 
1400 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
February 2001 through April 2001, when Makaio was about 
seventeen to nineteen months old, Peggy Radke’s housemate, Paul 
Gutierrez, physically and sexually abused Makaio, eventually killing 
him.111 
In February 2001, Makaio became the subject of investigation 
by the Freeborn County Human Services Department after a 
physician or nurse observed bruises and lesions and made a 
report.112  Tammy Ressler, a social worker, visited the home in early 
March and was told that Makaio had fallen down.113  Neither 
Ressler nor the County investigated the situation further.114  In late 
March, Matthew Radke took Makaio to the police, who 
photographed Makaio, and to an urgent care center.115  A physician 
at the urgent care center examined Makaio’s multiple bruises, 
multiple abrasions, and a burn, and reported the suspected abuse 
to the Human Services Department.116  Four days later, Ressler 
visited the home and interviewed Peggy Radke and Gutierrez, who 
provided an explanation for the marks.117  Ressler sent Matthew 
Radke a letter stating that the bruise on Makaio’s foot had not been 
intentionally inflicted and that child protection services were not 
necessary.118  About two weeks later, in early April, Matthew Radke 
and Makaio’s guardian ad litem separately contacted the police 
about bruises on Makaio’s face and about their concerns that 
Makaio was being abused.119  Social worker Lisa Frank went to the 
home about seven to ten days later.120  Frank, aware of the prior 
abuse allegations, observed fresh bruises on Makaio’s face, rib cage, 
and backbone, and saw a foot injury, but took no immediate 
 
Complaint at ¶ 29, Radke v. County of Freeborn, No. C6-02-1692 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
Freeborn County 2003). 
 111. In State v. Gutierrez, 667 N.W.2d 426, 439 (Minn. 2003), the supreme court 
affirmed Gutierrez’s conviction of first-degree murder while committing or 
attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree, first-
degree murder while committing child abuse, and second-degree felony murder 
while committing or attempting to commit assault in the first degree. 
 112. Complaint, supra note 110, at 3; Joint and Separate Answer of Defendants 
County of Freeborn, Lisa Frank and Tammy Ressler at 2, Radke v. County of 
Freeborn, No. C6-02-1692 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Freeborn County 2003). 
 113. Complaint, supra note 110, at 3. 
 114. See id. 
 115. Id. at 3-4. 
 116. Id. at 4; Answer, supra note 112, at 3. 
 117. Complaint, supra note 110, at 4; Answer, supra note 112, at 3. 
 118. Complaint, supra note 110, at 4-5; Answer, supra note 112, at 3. 
 119. Complaint, supra note 110, at 5. 
 120. Complaint, supra note 110, at 5-6; Answer, supra note 112, at 3-4. 
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precautions.121  Makaio died that same night when left in 
Gutierrez’s care, after suffering numerous bruises, abrasions, and 
fractures.122 
Freeborn County, Frank, and Ressler’s Answer denied that the 
County’s agents were aware of any physical abuse.123  In their 
Answer, these defendants argued that the report received in late 
February was anonymous, and did not contain all of the details of 
the physician’s observations.124  The Answer denied that the 
defendants had all the information about the late March medical 
exam125 and asserted that Ressler did not observe symptoms of 
neglect or abuse in her late March 2001 visit to the home.126  Frank 
contended that she had no reason to remove the child from the 
home, but that she had determined that further investigation was 
warranted.127 
The Answer also stated that the three defendants “acted in 
good faith and with due care,” that they “followed the procedures 
in Minnesota statutes,” that any negligence on their part was not 
the proximate cause of injury to Makaio, and that Gutierrez’s 
behavior was a superseding and intervening act.128  The defendants 
asserted that 
 the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted;129 
 the cause of action alleged by Radke “comes from public 
duty,” and that the defendants owed the plaintiff no 
duty;130 and 
 the defendants were entitled to statutory immunity 
under provisions including CARA, statutory 
discretionary immunity, official immunity, and other 
common law and statutory immunities.131 
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to 
state a claim for which relief could be granted,132 and the district 
 
 121. Complaint, supra note 110, at 5-6; Answer, supra note 112, at 3-4. 
 122. Complaint, supra note 110, at 6-7; Answer, supra note 112, at 4. 
 123. Answer, supra note 112, at 3-4. 
 124. Id. at 2. 
 125. Id. at 3. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 3-4. 
 128. Id. at 4-5. 
 129. Id. at 5. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 5-6. 
 132. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Radke v. County of Freeborn, No. C6-02-
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court granted the motion.133 
Radke appealed, arguing that the defendants had assumed a 
duty to act with reasonable care and that this special duty gave rise 
to the wrongful death negligence claim.134  In March 2004, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that CARA does 
not contain a legislatively-established cause of action.135  The court 
found that CARA is comparable to VARA and determined that the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning from Hoppe, in which the 
supreme court held that the legislature did not identify a cause of 
action under VARA for alleged negligent investigation or 
intervention, should apply.136  Thus, although Radke brought a 
common law claim, it appears that by relying on Hoppe the court 
affirmed on the basis that no express or implied statutory cause of 
action was available. 
When affirming, the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that 
Radke’s complaint was not specifically based on the defendants’ 
failure to follow CARA.137  Without explicitly saying so, the court 
seemed to recognize that Radke was attempting to bring a common 
law claim, as he did not allege a statutory cause of action when he 
argued on appeal that the defendants owed Makaio a special duty.  
The court admitted the law was not “clear cut”138 and that it was 
sympathetic toward Radke, but nevertheless was “reluctant to 
supply what the legislature appeared to intentionally omit.”139 
While the court of appeals discussed Cracraft and Andrade, it 
did not rely on those cases or synthesize them with Hoppe; it simply 
held there was no legislatively established cause of action for the 
reasons discussed in Hoppe.140  This reliance on Hoppe seems 
consistent with the interpretation discussed above—that the 
legislature’s deliberate omission of a cause of action modified the 
common law in a way that precluded liability for the specific wrongs 
 
1692 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Freeborn County 2003).  The defendants moved to dismiss 
pursuant to Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 12.02(b) and 12.03.  Id. 
 133. Order of June 2, 2003, Radke v. County of Freeborn, No. C6-02-1692 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Freeborn County 2003) (dismissing the case with prejudice on the 
merits). 
 134. Radke v. County of Freeborn, 676 N.W.2d 295, 298 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2004). 
 135. Id. at 301. 
 136. Id. at 300. 
 137. Id. at 298. 
 138. Id. at 300. 
 139. Id. at 298-300. 
 140. Id. 
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alleged in this case.  This reading is also consistent with the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ brief mention of the Valtakis case,141 
where the same court held that no statutory civil cause of action 
was available for failure to make a required report of child abuse 
because the legislature failed to provide a civil remedy when it 
outlined criminal penalties for that behavior.142 
Radke appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, raising the 
legal issue of whether a cause of action existed for the wrongful 
death of a child caused by the negligence of a county and two social 
workers who assumed a special duty to the child.143 
C. The Arguments Raised by the Parties 
In their briefs to the Minnesota Supreme Court, appellant 
Radke primarily relied on Cracraft and Andrade, while respondents 
Freeborn County and the social workers generally argued that 
Hoppe controlled.144  Neither party focused on the distinction 
between statutory and common law causes of action, or the 
circumstances under which a statute would be regarded as having 
modified the common law (which, as we have seen, seemed to 
factor into the supreme court’s Hoppe decision). 
Radke argued that the court of appeals misapplied the third 
Cracraft factor and failed to apply the other factors when it found 
that there was no language in CARA that explicitly or impliedly 
permitted a civil cause of action.145  He then contended that the 
third Cracraft factor alone was sufficient to allow a cause of action 
because Makaio was within the class of persons that the statute was 
designed to protect, and the other factors were “helpful.”146  In his 
brief, Radke asserted that the county had actual knowledge of the 
abuse, that there were insufficient facts in the record to determine 
whether Radke had reasonably relied on the actions of the county, 
and that the county increased the harm to Makaio by failing to 
remove him from the home, particularly on the day of his death.147 
Radke argued that Hoppe was distinguishable because that case 
 
 141. Id. at 298. 
 142. Valtakis v. Putnam, 504 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
 143. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at v, Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 
N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 2005) (No. A03-797). 
 144. Id. at 9-16, 20-31; Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 8-13, 16-22, Radke v. 
County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 2005) (No. A03-797). 
 145. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 143, at 10. 
 146. Id. at 11-14. 
 147. Id. at 21-28. 
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involved the county’s failure to initiate an investigation, while this 
case involved the county’s negligence while conducting an 
investigation.148  Because this case involved a negligent 
investigation, Radke asserted, the county had assumed a duty of 
care and breached that duty.149  Finally, Radke distinguished CARA 
from VARA and argued that Hoppe did not apply to this case 
because there were greater public policy concerns due to children 
being more vulnerable than adults.150 
The county argued that CARA is almost identical to VARA, and 
contended that, as a result, Hoppe dictated that no cause of action 
was available under CARA.151  The county further argued that 
because no cause of action is available under CARA, no other 
theory of liability—such as a special duty under Cracraft or Andrade, 
or an assumed duty—was available.152  Thus, in essence, the county 
argued that the absence of a statutory cause of action precluded any 
common law claim. 
D. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
In its decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court first discussed 
the principle from Andrade that a person generally only has a 
common law duty to prevent a third person from harming another 
if there is some sort of special relationship, noted that it applied 
this principle to government torts in Cracraft when it stated that a 
governmental unit can only be found liable if the governmental 
unit owed “the plaintiff a duty different than that owed to the 
general public,” and then reiterated that Cracraft set out the test for 
determining whether a special duty exists.153  The court explained 
that the existence of a statute such as CARA cannot alone create a 
special duty because there must be additional indicia that the 
governmental unit undertook the responsibility of protecting a 
particular class of persons “from the risks associated with a 
particular harm.”154  It then described the four Cracraft factors, 
reiterating that they are not exhaustive and that there is no bright 
 
 148. Id. at 19. 
 149. Id. at 29-32. 
 150. Id. at 32-36. 
 151. Brief of Respondent-Appellee, supra note 144, at 7-8. 
 152. Id. at 11-14. 
 153. Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Minn. 2005). 
 154. Id. (citing Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn. 
1979)). 
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line rule, but explained that it found in Andrade that the third 
factor was “so overwhelmingly dominant” that it had no difficulty 
finding a special relation, even though two of the four Cracraft 
factors had not been met.155   
The court then discussed its decision in Hoppe in terms that are 
remarkably circumspect for a case about to be overruled.  The 
court stated that it had found in Hoppe that VARA could not “form 
the basis for a civil cause of action in negligence,”156 a description 
which appears to be a tacit admission that Hoppe involved a 
common law cause of action rather than a statutory one.  Similarly, 
the Radke court noted that Hoppe had distinguished Andrade 
without directly analyzing the Cracraft factors when it held that no 
cause of action was available to the guardian of a vulnerable adult 
because the legislature did not expressly or impliedly create a cause 
of action when enacting VARA.157  Curiously, however, the court 
did not directly confront the propriety of Hoppe’s reliance on the 
implied statutory cause of action analysis in place of the common 
law public duty analysis. 
Instead, the court explained that although Radke could be 
distinguished from Hoppe on the basis that VARA and CARA are 
only similar and not identical, its true reason for distinguishing the 
two was based on public policy concerns—specifically, that the 
concerns raised in Radke were similar to those raised in Andrade: 
providing a safe environment for children in a private home.158  
The court reiterated that whether a common law cause of action is 
available due to a statute’s creation of a special duty involves a case-
by-case analysis of the Cracraft factors.159 
The court began with the third Cracraft factor and found that 
CARA sets forth mandatory reporting and investigatory acts that are 
for the protection of a particular class of persons—children who 
are identified as suspected victims of abuse or neglect—rather than 
the public in general and, as a result, held that the third Cracraft 
factor was satisfied.160  The court then analyzed the other Cracraft 
factors, finding that Freeborn County had actual knowledge of the 
abuse; that while it could not conclusively find that Radke 
 
 155. Id. at 794 (citing Andrade v. Ellefson, 391 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 
1986)). 
 156. Id. at 795. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 795-96. 
 159. Id. at 796. 
 160. Id. at 797. 
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reasonably relied on the county’s representations, it was difficult to 
speculate what more Radke could have done about the situation; 
and that Radke did not establish that the county increased the risk 
of harm to Makaio.161  Despite the fact that not all factors were 
satisfied, the supreme court found that, like in Andrade, the third 
factor was overwhelmingly dominant and that the county owed 
Makaio a special duty.162  It thus held that “a cause of action can be 
maintained for negligence in the investigation of child abuse and 
neglect reports as required under CARA,” and reversed and 
remanded the case to the district court.163 
V. CONCLUSION: LINGERING QUESTIONS 
By all appearances, Radke fully restores Cracraft and the public 
duty rule as a legal doctrine that stands separate and distinct from 
the analysis used to discover implicit statutory causes of action.  But 
for some reason, the court appears to have been reluctant to come 
right out and say as much.  Even when ultimately overruling Hoppe, 
the court was circumspect, stating that it found it impossible to 
harmonize Hoppe with Cracraft and Andrade and that it was 
overruling Hoppe to avoid eviscerating “the legal principles 
regarding special duties set forth in Cracraft and Andrade.”164 
Because the Radke court determined that the Hoppe and Radke 
cases each dealt with common law claims regarding governmental 
actors’ duties under reporting statutes but had different outcomes, 
one can understand why the court felt it had to overrule Hoppe to 
achieve uniformity.  Absent a more detailed explanation by the 
supreme court, however, it remains unclear in what ways the court 
believes the analysis in Hoppe was flawed or how to synthesize 
Bruegger with Cracraft and its progeny.   
In this and other respects, Radke represents something of a 
missed opportunity to truly clarify this area of the law.  As already 
noted, the court did suggest that it was restoring the principle that 
a common law negligence claim can be brought based on duties 
prescribed by statute.165  But, it is still unclear what specific factors 
the supreme court will apply to determine whether a statute implies 
 
 161. Id. at 797-98. 
 162. Id. at 798. 
 163. Id. at 799.  The court noted that the issue of immunity was not before it.  
Id. at 799 n.6. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
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a cause of action separate and apart from any common law cause of 
action.  And perhaps most seriously, the court did not squarely 
address the notion lurking behind Bruegger and Hoppe—that the 
legislature’s withholding of an express cause of action may be 
interpreted as an affirmative act intended to alter the underlying 
common law to preclude private common law causes of action.  
Future case law applying Radke and these other cases may bring 
additional clarity to these issues. 
 
 
 
